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Abstract—While cloud computing has exploded in popularity
in recent years thanks to the potential efficiency and cost
savings of outsourcing the storage and management of data and
applications, a number of vulnerabilities that led to multiple
attacks have deterred many potential users.
As a result, experts in the field argued that new mechanisms
are needed in order to create trusted and secure cloud services.
Such mechanisms would eradicate the suspicion of users towards
cloud computing by providing the necessary security guarantees.
Searchable Encryption is among the most promising solutions –
one that has the potential to help offer truly secure and privacy-
preserving cloud services. We start this paper by surveying
the most important searchable encryption schemes and their
relevance to cloud computing. In light of this analysis we
demonstrate the inefficiencies of the existing schemes and expand
our analysis by discussing certain confidentiality and privacy
issues. Further, we examine how to integrate such a scheme with
a popular cloud platform. Finally, we have chosen – based on the
findings of our analysis – an existing scheme and implemented it
to review its practical maturity for deployment in real systems.
The survey of the field, together with the analysis and with the
extensive experimental results provides a comprehensive review
of the theoretical and practical aspects of searchable encryption.
Index Terms—Searchable Encryption, Security, Cloud Com-
puting, Cloud Storage
I. INTRODUCTION
IN recent years we have witnessed an astonishing increase inthe offer of cloud computing solutions. Leveraging savings
through large scale optimizations and reduction of wasted
resources (inactive computer time, unused hardware space,
etc), this business model offers clear economic advantages.
Along with the continuous increase in the amount of data,
this provides a strong incentive for both organizations and
private users to opt for storing their data with cloud service
providers (CSPs). However, this trend raises a security issue,
since many clients want to keep their files confidential. The
solution may be to encrypt the files before sending them to the
CSP, but there are two seemingly contradictory goals that an
encryption scheme should achieve in order to be useful in this
scenario. On one hand, the encryption must satisfy a strong
notion of security in order to keep the data hidden from the
CSP. On the other hand, the scheme should allow the clients to
continue performing their operations efficiently, i.e., with time
and computational costs comparable to the ones for locally
stored files. Searching often a quintessential requirement for
many clients. It is therefore essential to develop and employ
encryption schemes that allow for efficient searching of the
data stored in the cloud; if the clients have to download the
entire data set and perform the search locally, then the scheme
is completely impractical.
Searchable Encryption (SE) is an enhanced encryption
technique that allows encryption while enabling search for
keywords in the encrypted data (as it would be possible in
the plaintext). Its quintessential application is cloud storage.
Using searchable encryption should enable a CSP – with
the help of a search token sent by the client – to locally
perform some operations and then send the relevant data to
the client. The relevant data should on one hand contain
the matching documents (i.e., the documents that contain the
searched keyword), while on the other hand its size should be
not much larger than that of the matching documents (i.e., the
server cannot simply transfer a large part of the database to the
client on every query). Of course the CSP should not learn the
keyword that is being searched or the search query, otherwise
he is learning partial information about the documents.
Searchable encryption clearly displays trade-offs between
efficiency, functionality and security. From an efficiency point
of view, it is desirable to reduce as much as possible the
number of operations performed by the server during a search.
It is also highly important to make these operations par-
allelizable and increase their locality (in order to improve
I/O performance), in order to improve the search time. From
the functionality point of view, one important parameter is
the query expressiveness. An SE scheme should support as
powerful queries as possible, thus increasing the usefulness
of the scheme to the clients. Other important parameters are
whether a single or multiple clients should be able to write
data to the cloud and whether a single or multiple clients
should be able to read the data. Additionally, schemes for
practical applications should be dynamic, i.e., they should
allow database updates without additional leakage. From a
security point of view, it is essential to reduce the leakage
caused by all operations as much as possible.
Depending on the requirements of the desired scheme, it
possible to use either public-key cryptography or symmetric-
key cryptography. However, often searchable public-key en-
cryption schemes with good security guarantees do not scale
well because they have search time which is linear in the
number of documents.
Symmetric searchable encryption was introduced by Song
et al. [1], who presented a scheme that allowed linear search
time (in the number of documents) by the server. Unfortunately
their scheme does not achieve a strong notion of security: it has
no security guarantees related to the leakage that can be caused
by the use of the search tokens that are given to the server
in order to allow the search to be performed on the server
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in order to achieve linear search time with stronger security
guarantees. Unfortunately the search time of this approach is
inherently linear in the number of files. Curtmola et al. [3]
presented the first secure scheme with sub-linear search time
using an inverted index approach (uses the keywords as index)
and also introduced a strong security model for searchable
encryption which became the standard security notion for
searchable encryption in the last several years. The inverted
index approach is quite efficient and is in fact optimal for the
number of operations that the server has to perform during a
search, which led to it being used in many subsequent works
(e.g., [4], [5], [6]). One limitation of this method is that it is
inherently sequential, preventing it from taking advantage of
parallelism to improve performance. Another issue is that it
is not well-suited for dynamic databases, which is the case of
most applications. Recent works made progress in the direction
of dynamic [5], [7], [8], [9], [10] and parallel [7], [11], [8]
schemes.
Symmetric searchable encryption perfectly fits the scenario
of a single user writing to/reading from the database. How-
ever, there is a generic construction that combines a single
writer/reader scheme with broadcast encryption in order to
obtain a scheme that supports multiple readers [3]. One
additional issue in this case is revocation: a revoked user
should not be able to perform searches after the revocation
has occurred.
In terms of query expressiveness, most symmetric search-
able encryption schemes focus on single equality queries.
Some recent works [11], [12] demonstrated that it is possi-
ble to extend data structures for single keyword symmetric
searchable encryption in order to deal with more complex
queries, such as conjunctive queries for keyword combinations
and general Boolean queries.
Public-key searchable encryption was introduced by Boneh
et al. [13]. It allows multiple clients to encrypt data into
the database, which can be decrypted by the data owner that
has the secret-key. Other solutions allow conjunctive, subset
and range queries [14]. The efficiency of these schemes is
limited by the cost of public-key operations. Another problem
of the proposed schemes with strong security assurances is
their linear search time, which limits scalability.
So far, to the best of our knowledge, no public cloud
offering is known to support storage protection with searchable
encryption support. To explore the feasibility of searchable
encryption for cloud storage, we have chosen to implement it
using a popular open-source cloud platform.
OpenStack.: OpenStack is an open-source cloud com-
puting software platform that was first released in 2010 and
currently developed under the guidance of the OpenStack
Foundation, a non-profit corporation entity. This project is
supported by more than 200 companies around the world,
including key industry players. Our goal is to integrate search-
able encryption within cloud storage solutions based on the
OpenStack platform. One important criterium for the success
of such attempt is the ability of introducing search capacities
for the encrypted data with minimal modification on the server
side, in order to facilitate its adoption by the OpenStack
community.
A. Our Contribution
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we present
a theoretical analysis of the existing Symmetric Searchable
Encryption schemes. In light of this analysis, we demonstrate
the inefficiencies of the existing schemes while we expand
our analysis by discussing certain privacy issues. Apart from
that, we focus on integrating such a scheme with Openstack –
an open-source popular cloud platform. Finally, based on the
findings of our analysis, we have chosen to implement and test
one of the existing schemes, in order to understand whether it
is practical enough for deployment in real systems. As a result,
our theoretical analysis is coupled with extensive experimental
results. We hope that the findings of this work will give
valuable insights to protocol designers and will spawn further
research in the area.
B. Organization
In Section II we discuss in more detail why searchable
encryption fits perfectly the cloud. In Section III we present in
more detail the concept of searchable encryption and its secu-
rity model. In Section IV we survey the current known meth-
ods for building symmetric searchable encryption schemes.
Then in Section V we highlight some considerations regarding
the privacy of such schemes while in Section VI we elaborate
on their efficiency. Section VII presents the architecture of
OpenStack. Then in Section VIII we give our recommendation
of the scheme that seems more appropriate for the integration
with OpenStack-based solutions. Section IX reports on the
performance of the implemented scheme. Finally, in Section X
we conclude the paper.
II. WHY SEARCHABLE ENCRYPTION SQUARELY FITS THE
CLOUD
While cloud computing has exploded in popularity in recent
years thanks to the potential efficiency and cost savings
of outsourcing the management of data and applications, a
number of vulnerabilities that led to various attacks have left
many potential users worried [15]. As a result, experts in the
field argued that new technologies are needed in order to create
trusted cloud services [16], [17] – services that will eventually
eradicate the suspicion of users for cloud computing by provid-
ing the necessary security guarantees. More precisely, despite
significant improvements regarding availability and scalability
of cloud services, it has been observed that the greatest concern
of users that hinders the adoption of cloud computing is the
fear of storing sensitive data online. Without proper security
mechanisms to protect users’ data from unauthorized access,
sensitive information is at risk of being leaked to interested
third parties.
The most common solution to this problem is to make sure
that users’ data is always encrypted when it is placed on the
provider’s storage hosts and while it is in use by the cloud
service. However, such an approach does not always provide
full security since all of the trust is placed on the party that
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precisely, once the cloud provider is responsible for encrypting
the data it becomes aware of the encryption/decryption key,
casting doubts on the security of users’ data in case of a
malicious provider or a malicious administrator.
One of the most promising concepts first introduced by Song
et al. [1] is the so called searchable encryption where users can
search directly on encrypted data without having to decrypt
them first. In general, searchable encryption schemes aim
to provide confidentiality and integrity, while retaining main
benefits of cloud storage – availability, reliability, data sharing,
and ensuring requirements through cryptographic guarantees
rather than administrative controls. However, until to this day
there is a lack of practical applications that rely on searchable
encryption schemes. To the best of our knowledge, there is
no public cloud provider that supports such functionality and
the main reason for that is the fact that in order to provide
a reliable and efficient implementation requires additional
research.
Furthermore, the latest advancements in the field of search-
able encryption have the potential to allow cloud providers to
build different kinds of security levels, which will eventually
lead to various business models. Therefore, building a concrete
searchable encryption scheme for the cloud will give the
opportunity to cloud providers to offer a range of security
options for the users. More precisely, in an ideal scenario users
will be able to configure the level of security based on what
kind of searchable encryption they want to use. For example,
options such as the blind storage that were proposed in [9],
where users can encrypt their data locally before sending them
to the cloud and then can search directly over the encrypted
data stored in the cloud provider, will provide a set of strong
security guarantees to the users since they will be sure that
even in the case of a malicious cloud provider or a corrupted
administrator the stored data will be secured since the users
will be the only ones who have access to the encryption key.
In other words, even if the cloud provider tries to expose the
privacy of users by looking at the stored data it will not be
able to find any valuable information as long as the underlying
cryptosystem is secure. As a second example, we can consider
a protocol that will be based on proxy re-encryption that
was first introduced in [18] and allows a semi-trusted party
to search through the data stored in the cloud by using a
searchable encryption key. In contrast to the previous example,
such a scenario will weaken the adversarial model since the
users will have to trust a third party – the proxy server –
but at the same time will offer better efficiency since all the
computations will not take place on user’s machine but on
the proxy. Furthermore, by using searchable encryption cloud
providers will be able to offer a plethora of options to the
users and will eventually be able to address even the more
demanding needs in the sense of data protection.
In addition to that, cloud services that are solely based on
searchable encryption schemes are the perfect candidates for
providing a realistic and reliable solution for the increasingly
urgent problem of physical location of data in cloud storage.
In a short time, the aforementioned problem has evolved from
the concern of a few regulated businesses to an important
consideration for many cloud storage users. One of the charac-
teristics of cloud storage is fluid transfer of data both within
and among the data centres of a cloud provider. However,
this has weakened the guarantees with respect to control
over data replicas, protection of data in transit and physical
location of data. Moreover, after the revelations of E. Snowden
some months ago and the NSA scandal the significance for
finding a reliable solution that will tackle this problem is of
paramount importance. Even though, searchable encryption
will not provide a direct solution for a trusted geolocation-
based mechanism for data placement control, it has the poten-
tial to protect users’ private data from unauthorized access by
providing the indispensable proofs ensuring that unencrypted
data will only be available in jurisdictions allowed by policies
and defined by the data owner.
III. GENERAL MODEL OF SEARCHABLE ENCRYPTION
Searchable encryption allows a client to encrypt its data in
such a way that he can generate search tokens that allows
the storage server to search over the encrypted data. The
data can be viewed as a collection f = ( f1, . . . , fn) of n files
where file fi is a sequence of words (w1, . . . ,wm) from some
keyword space W. Additionally, each file fi has an unique
identifier id( fi). The data is dynamic, thus file additions or
removals are allowed. In addition to the search tokens, the
client also generates and sends to the server add/delete tokens
when he wants to add/delete files from the encrypted database.
We formalize the notion of dynamic symmetric searchable
encryption (SSE) scheme using the extensions to the dynamic
setting by Kamara et al. [5] of the definition of Curtmola et
al. [3].
Definition 1 (Dynamic Index-based SSE): A
dynamic index-based symmetric searchable encryption
scheme is a tuple of nine polynomial algorithms
SSE = (Gen,Enc,SearchToken,AddToken,DeleteToken,
Search,Add,Delete,Dec) such that:
• Gen is probabilistic key-generation algorithm that takes
as input a security parameter λ and outputs a secret key
K . It is used by the client to generate his secret-key.
• Enc is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input a secret
key K and a collection of files f and outputs an encrypted
index γ and a sequence of ciphertexts c. It is used by the
client to get ciphertexts corresponding to his files as well
as an encrypted index which are then sent to the storage
server.
• SearchToken is a (possibly probabilistic) algorithm that
takes as input a secret key K and a keyword w and outputs
a search token τs(w). It is used by the client in order
to create a search token for some specific keyword. The
token is then sent to the storage server.
• AddToken is a (possibly probabilistic) algorithm that
takes as input a secret key K and a file f and outputs
an add token τa( f ) and a ciphertext cf . It is used by the
client in order to create an add token for a new file as
well as the encryption of the file, which are then sent to
the storage server.
• DeleteToken is a (possibly probabilistic) algorithm that
takes as input a secret key K and a file f and outputs
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create a delete token for some file which is then sent to
the storage server.
• Search is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input
an encrypted index γ, a sequence of ciphertexts c and
a search token τs(w) and outputs a sequence of file
identifiers Iw ⊂ c. This algorithm is used by the storage
server upon receiving a search token in order to perform
the search over the encrypted data and determine which
ciphertexts correspond to the searched keyword and thus
should be sent to the client.
• Add is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input an en-
crypted index γ, a sequence of ciphertexts c, an add token
τa( f ) and a ciphertext cf and outputs a new encrypted
index γ′ and a new sequence of ciphertexts c′. This
algorithm is used by the storage server upon receiving
an add token in order to update the encrypted index and
the ciphertext vector to include the data corresponding to
the new file.
• Delete is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input
an encrypted index γ, a sequence of ciphertexts c and a
delete token τd( f ) and outputs a new encrypted index γ′
and a new sequence of ciphertexts c′. This algorithm is
used by the storage server upon receiving a delete token
in order to update the encrypted index and the ciphertext
vector to delete the data corresponding to the deleted file.
• Dec is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a
secret key K and a ciphertext c and outputs a file f . It is
used by the client to decrypt the ciphertexts that obtained
from the storage server.
A dynamic SSE scheme is correct if for all possible se-
curity parameters and file collections, and for secret keys,
encrypted indexes and ciphertexts created using the respec-
tive algorithms and for any sequences of add, delete and
search operations handled using the respective algorithms.
It holds that the search operation always returns the cor-
rect set of indices corresponding to the searched keyword
and the returned ciphertexts can be correctly decrypted. A
static SSE scheme can be defined by omitting the algorithms
AddToken,DeleteToken,Add and Delete from the definition.
On an intuitive level, a good security notion for searchable
encryption would be to require that nothing is leaked to the
storage server beyond the outcome of the search (also known
as access pattern), i.e., the identifiers of the documents that
contain the queried keyword. Note that the access pattern
can only be hidden using expensive techniques as oblivious
RAMs [19], [20]. But the practical searchable encryption
schemes normally leak more than that: they also leak whether
two queries were for the same keyword or not, which is
called the search pattern. The search pattern is leaked for
instance if deterministic search tokens are used, which is the
case in the most efficient solutions. Given this, a reasonable
definition of security for searchable encryption is requiring
that nothing is leaked beyond the access and search patterns.
We should mention that some dynamic SSE schemes also leak
information during the add/delete operations.
This intuitive idea is captured using the extension to the
setting of dynamic SSE schemes (as in [5]) of the security
definition of Curtmola et al. [3], the so-called security against
adaptive chosen-keyword attacks (CKA2). The leakage func-
tions associated to index creation, search, addition and delete
operations are denoted as LI , LS , LA, LD respectively. Then
the security is defined using the simulation paradigm, which
is the standard way of defining strong security guarantees in
cryptography.
Definition 2 (Dynamic CKA2-Security): Let
SSE = (Gen,Enc,SearchToken,AddToken,DeleteToken,
Search,Add,Delete,Dec) be a dynamic index-based
symmetric searchable encryption scheme and LI , LS , LA,
LD be leakage functions. Then the following experiments are
considered:
• RealA(λ): The secret key K is generated by running
Gen(1λ). The adversary A chooses a file collection f and
then receives an encrypted index γ and the ciphertexts c
such that (γ, c) $← Enc(K, f). The adversary A can make
a polynomial number of adaptive queries to get search,
add and delete tokens. The tokens are generated using
the respective algorithms of SSE (the ciphertext is also
generated in the case of an addition) and given to the
adversary. Finally A outputs a bit b indicating whether
he thinks he is the real or ideal experiment.
• IdealA,S(λ): The adversary A chooses a file collection
f. The simulator S only gets LI (f) and has to simulate
an encrypted index γ and ciphertexts c to send to the
adversary. The adversary A is again allowed to make
adaptive queries to get search, add and delete tokens; but
the simulator has to generate the tokens (and also the
ciphertext in the case of additions) to sent to the adversary
given only the leakage from either LS , LA or LD . Finally
A outputs a bit b indicating whether he thinks he is the
real or ideal experiment.
SSE is (LI , LS , LA, LD)-secure against adap-
tive dynamic chosen-keyword attacks if for all prob-
abilistic polynomial time adversaries A, there exists
a probabilistic polynomial time simulator S such thatPr [RealA(λ) = 1 ] − Pr [ IdealA,S(λ) = 1 ]  ≤ negl(λ).
The intuition behind this definition is that if every adversary
cannot distinguish whether the encrypted index, ciphertexts
and tokens given to him were generated using the real data and
the scheme SSE or by a simulator which only gets as input
the information specified by the leakage functions, then SSE
only leaks the information specified by the leakage functions.
Using this security definition the leakage of the scheme
SSE can be formally defined. As dynamic index-based sym-
metric searchable encryption schemes should leak as little
information as possible, a good example would be: LI leaking
only the number of files and unique keywords, the identifiers of
the files and the size of the files, LS leaking only the search
and access patterns, LA leaking only the size and identifier
of the added file as well as the updated number of unique
keywords and LD leaking only the updated number of unique
keywords.
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A. Two-Layered Encryption Scheme
The first construction of SSE was presented by Song et
al. [1], who developed a solution based on a special two-
layered encryption scheme. The idea is to encrypt each key-
word separately using a deterministic encryption scheme in the
first layer and then use a stream cipher with a special structure
for the second layer of the encryption. The keystream for the
second level is generate in a special way which allows the
detection of the keywords during an execution of the search
algorithm. More specifically, for a keyword w, in the first layer
a deterministic encryption x = E(w) of w is computed and
then parsed in two parts x = x` ‖xr . The first part x` is then
used to generate a key k for a hash function h. Finally the
keystream is chosen by picking a random seed s, which is
xored with x` , and then computing h(k, s), that is xored with
xr . In order to perform a search for the keyword w the search
token τs(w) is x = E(w) and the key k generated from x` .
With this token the server can perform the search by testing
for each ciphertext c whether c ⊕ x has the format s‖h(k, s) for
some s or not. Unfortunately this schemes has some problems:
first, the scheme uses fix-sized keywords and is not compatible
with existing encryption standards; second, it does not achieve
a strong notion of security – it has no security guarantees
related to search capabilities of the scheme, the only security
guarantees is about the ciphertext themselves (which are IND-
CPA secure). Indeed the scheme leaks the position of the
keyword within the document, which can lead to attacks based
on statistical analysis; finally, the search time is linear in the
total number of words contained in the documents.
B. (Forward) Index Approach
The first approach for designing SSE schemes with stronger
security guarantees and linear search time in the number of
documents was the (forward) index approach introduced by
Goh [2]. In such approach, for each document, there is an
associated encrypted data structure that is used for searching
the keywords. The index is independent of the underlying
encryption algorithm. A user that possess the secret key can
generate a search token for a specific keyword, which allows
the server to search for the files containing that keyword using
the index. Goh’s scheme [2] uses Bloom filters [21] to build
the index. Bloom filters are a data structure that can be used
to answer set membership queries. It uses an array of ` bits
which are initially 0. For each element w to be added into
the set, t independent hashes of w are computed, where each
hash function hi hashes into the set {1, . . . , `}, and then the
bits hi(w) are set to 1. Using this data structure, it is possible
to check whether the keyword is present in a document or not
by checking whether all the bits outputted by hi(w) are set to 1
or not. But this method inherently produces false positives. To
avoid leaking information about the keywords, Goh’s scheme
first process the keyword using two pseudorandom functions
before inserting them in the Bloom filters (the second function
also takes as input an unique document identifier in order
to avoid leaking similarities between the documents). One
problem with this approach is that the number of 1s in the
Bloom filter leaks information about the number of keywords
associated with that document.
Chang and Mitzenmacher [22] developed a solution without
false positives. The idea is to use a prebuilt dictionary of
keywords to build an index per document. It is represented
as an array with ` bits, where ` is the number of distinct
keywords and each bit represents a keyword. A pseudorandom
permutation is used to hide which keyword corresponds to
each bit.
The main drawback of the forward index approach is that its
search time is inherently linear in the number of files since the
search is performed by using the encrypted data structure that
is associated with each specific file. Additionally, the security
notions used on the works mentioned above do not guarantee
the security of the search tokens.
C. Inverted Index Approach
The central idea of the inverted index approach is to use an
index per distinct keyword instead of per distinct document.
This change reduces the search time from linear in the number
of documents to linear in the number of documents that contain
the searched keyword, which is optimal. The first schemes
using this approach were presented by Curtmola et al. [3].
The idea of the scheme is that for each keyword w there is a
linked list Lw which contains the identifiers of the documents
that contain the keyword w. But these linked lists cannot be
store in a straight-forward and unencrypted way, since this
would leak information. The idea is that the nodes of all linked
lists are stored together in an array A, in a scrambled order and
in an encrypted format. The plaintext of each node consists
of three parts: the identifier of one document, the key used to
encrypt the next node of the linked list and the pointer to the
next node of the linked list. What is then needed in order to
perform the search for keyword w is the key used to encrypt
the first node of Lw and a pointer to its location within A. This
information is stored encrypted in a pseudorandom position of
a look-up table T . The search token τs(w) then consists of the
position in T used for keyword w together with the key that
was used to encrypt this entry of T . This scheme achieves
security according to the strong security notion of Curtmola
et al. [3] against non-adaptive adversaries, i.e., the adversary
has to choose the values it will query at onset before seeing
any other information.
In order to obtain security against adaptive adversaries,
Curtmola et al. [3] also proposed a second scheme, with
increased communication and storage complexities. The idea
is to use a look-up table T directly, but with extended labels.
For a keyword w appearing in n documents, the extended
labels are w‖1, . . .w‖n and for each of them there is an
associated pseudorandom entry of T containing the identifier
of one of the documents in which w appears. The keyword
wMAX that appears more often on distinct documents has to be
determined and in also how many documents MAX it appears.
The search token for w consists of the outputs of permutation
that scrambles T applied on the inputs w‖1, . . .w‖MAX. The
scheme pads the table with dummy entries so that the identifier
of each document appears in the same number of entries. The
6search in this scheme is linear in the maximum number of
documents that contain a single keyword, i.e. MAX.
Chase and Kamara [4] proposed structured encryption,
which is a generalization of index-based SSE schemes. They
also noticed that the simpler scheme of Curtmola et al. [3] (i.e.,
the one that is only secure against non-adaptive adversaries)
can be also be made secure against adaptive adversaries by
requiring the symmetric encryption scheme that is used to
encrypt the nodes to be non-committing.
Kurosawa and Ohtaki [6] showed that it is possible to
extend the second SSE scheme of Curtmola et al. [3] (i.e.,
the one that is secure against adaptive adversaries and has
linear search time) in order to achieve a stronger notion of
security (UC security [23]) that guarantees security against
active adversaries (instead of only against passive ones, as
considered in the other works). The idea is to extend the
scheme by using message authentication codes in order to
make it a verifiable SSE scheme. The biggest limitation of
the resulting scheme is its linear search time.
One big limitation of the above schemes is that they are
not explicitly dynamic. The arrays would need to be updated
when a file addition/deletion is performed, and using general
techniques for making it dynamic would result in an inefficient
final scheme. Another significant limitation is that they are
not parallelizable since the encrypted indexes used in these
schemes store data at random positions and the location of
the next position to be accessed is only learned when the data
in the current one is retrieved.
1) Achieving Dynamicity Using a Deletion Array: One idea
to obtain a dynamic SSE is to use a deletion array [5]. Using
the simpler scheme of Curtmola et al. [3] (which is secure
against non-adaptive) as a starting point, Kamara et al. [5] were
able to perform modifications in order to obtain the first secure
dynamic SSE scheme1, which is proven secure in the random
oracle model. The two limitations of the original scheme are
that it is only secure against non-adaptive adversaries and
that it is not explicitly dynamic. The first limitation can be
overcome by using a non-committing symmetric encryption
scheme as mentioned above, but the second one is more
difficult to overcome.
The problem is that when a file is added/deleted, the nodes
in the search array A have to be updated. More specifically,
when a file f is deleted, the nodes in A corresponding to f
should be cleared. When a file f is added, it is necessary to
locate free locations in A to add the nodes corresponding to f .
Additionally, when a file is added or deleted, some pointers in
the linked list have to be updated (but they are encrypted). To
deal with this, Kamara et al. [5] use the following techniques:
(1) a deletion array keeps track of the search array positions
that need to be modified if a file deletion occurs. This deletion
array can be queried given a token that is generated by the
client. (2) There is a list of free nodes which keeps tracks of
the free positions in the search array A and can be used by
the server when a file is added. (3) The pointers are encrypted
1van Liesdonk et al. [24] designed an explicitly dynamic SSE scheme.
However, they only presented a formal security proof for the case of static
file collections. Additionally, the encrypted index in their scheme is relatively
large.
using a homomorphic encryption scheme in order to allow
modifications without decrypting. Specifically, the encryption
is done by XORing the message with the output of a PRF
(note that this construction is also non-committing).
In the proof of security against adaptive adversaries of static
SSE schemes, the queried keywords can be chosen based on
the encrypted index and the results of the previous queries, and
this requires the simulator to create an encrypted index which
is equivocable, i.e., the simulator creates a “fake” encrypted
index. Later, when a keyword is queried for the first time,
the simulator can generate an appropriate search token τs(w).
This level of equivocation was achieved by simply using non-
committing encryption schemes [3], [4]. However, in the case
of dynamic SSE schemes, a higher level of equivocation is
required. The adversary can initially query a keyword w in
order to commit the simulator to a search token τs(w), then
add a file f that contains w (the simulator does not know
about this fact, and thus cannot modify the encrypted index
in a meaningful way) and finally query w again, at which
point the simulator is already committed to the search token
τs(w) but was unable to update the encrypted index to reflect
the changes. To address this, Kamara et al. [5] designed the
scheme so that the adversary needs to query a random oracle
during the search algorithm execution. The random oracle then
provides the required level of equivocation for the simulator.
The main problem with this scheme is that the leakage
function associated with the addition/deletion of files leaks too
much information, namely the search tokens corresponding
to the keywords contained in the added/deleted file. In the
important case in which the database is initially empty and
the files are incrementally added by the client, this scheme is
no more secure than using a deterministic encryption scheme.
2) Achieving Dynamicity by Learning the Inverted Index
On-the-Fly: Another idea to obtain dynamic SSE schemes is
to build the inverted index on-the-fly, as proposed by Hahn
and Kerschbaum [10]. It is based on the idea of learning
the inverted index for efficient access from the access pattern
itself. With this approach, one starts with a forward index
based searchable encryption scheme (using the files as index)
that requires linear scans and an empty inverted index. When
a keyword is searched for the first time, its access pattern
and deterministic search token (for the inverted index) are
learned. Next, the keyword is incorporated into the inverted
index. When new searches are done for the same keyword,
the inverted index is used to search in sub-linear time. Addi-
tionally, if an added/deleted file contains a keyword which is
already in the inverted index, then the entry corresponding to
that keyword in the inverted index is updated.
The central observation used in this approach is that the
search tokens of the known SSE constructions remain valid
for future usage (until the entire system is rekeyed). Hence,
if a keyword was already searched and its search token
learned by the server, then updating the inverted index entry
corresponding to that keyword can be done without leaking
additional information to the server (the server could already
use the old search token to test if the added/deleted files
contained that keyword anyway).
Using this approach it is possible to obtain a scheme
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number of search queries is large enough) and small index size,
and for which it is proved in the random oracle model that the
updates leak no more information than the access pattern (i.e.,
no more than what can be inferred from the search tokens).
The obtained scheme can either have no storage on the client
side other than the keys, or store the search history in the client
in order to improve the performance of the update procedure.
The main drawback of this approach is that the time for the
first search of a keyword is linear.
D. Keyword Red-Black Tree
Given the inherently sequential nature of the inverted index
approach and the fact that the dynamic SSE schemes based
on that approach are very complex and difficult to implement,
Kamara and Papamanthou [7] developed an alternative method
for obtaining SSE schemes, which also enjoys sub-linear
search time but is highly parallelizable and easily handles
dynamic file collections. It uses a structure similar to red-
black trees and so was named as keyword red-black tree. The
keyword red-black tree is then encrypted using pseudorandom
functions and permutations and a random oracle. The final
scheme has the same asymptotic efficiency as an unencrypted
keyword red-black tree.
The keyword red-black tree is binary tree-based multi-map
data structure. It is assumed that the universe of keywords is
fixed (m in total) and much smaller than the number of files,
which can grow dynamically. Additionally, a total order on the
documents f = ( f1, . . . , fn) is imposed by the ordering of the
identifiers. At the leaves of tree, pointers to the appropriate
documents are stored. At each internal node u of the tree,
a m-bit vector du = du,1 . . . du,m is stored, in which du,i
corresponds to the i-th keyword wi of the universe. The bit
du,i is set to 1 if, and only if, one of the files associated with
u’s children contains the keyword wi . This can be efficiently
computed by starting at the leaves, and then for the internal
nodes computing du as the bitwise OR of the values of its
two children. To search for a keyword wi , simply start at the
root and continue recursively until either a node is achieved
in which du,i = 0 (no file associated with the children nodes
contain wi) or a leaf is achieved for which the associated file
contains wi . One reason why this data structure is useful is that
it supports both keyword-based operations (following the paths
from the root to the leaves), which are used for searching,
and file-based operations (following paths from the leaves to
the root), which are used to handle updates. Another useful
property is that the search in each children can continue using
a different processor. The idea for encrypting the data structure
is as follows: for each keyword wi there is a distinct key that is
used to encrypt the bits du,i (for all u). The encrypted bit du,i
is then stored at one of two hash tables associated with node u,
at a pseudorandom position. Whether it is stored in the first or
second hash table depends on the output of a random oracle.
The other table will contain a random value in the respective
position. In order to perform an update, the server performs a
structure update on the keyword red-black tree, which involves
the necessary rotations that are performed during an update of
a red-black tree (in order to maintain a a logarithmic height).
Note that only the file identifier is required for performing this
operation. The server then sends to the client the part of the
tree that needs to be updated, and the clients answers with
a token that allows the server to update the values at those
positions.
Using these building blocks, the scheme was proved to be
secure in the random oracle model. The updates do not leak
any information apart from what can be inferred from the
previous search tokens (in contrast with the scheme by Kamara
et al. [5] for instance) and can be efficiently performed since
all information about a file f can be found and updated in
O(log |f |) time, but require one and a half rounds of interaction.
The total search time is almost optimal (loose by a factor
O(log |f |)), but it is easily parallelizable, and if ω(log |f |)
processors are used, its clock search time is smaller than
the optimal sequential search time. If a large enough number
of processors is available, the resulting clock search time is
of O(log |f |). One drawback of this scheme is that the data
structure has size O(m · |f |) and the constants are quite high.
E. Dictionary Entry per Combination of File and Keyword
As large databases are the main motivation for outsourcing
storage, Cash et al. [8] proposed a (dynamic) SSE scheme
based on a new approach that was designed with scalability to
very-large databases (in the order of billions of file/keyword
pairs) in mind. The new approach for designing (dynamic) SSE
schemes is based on the idea of storing each occurring combi-
nation (file f , keyword w) as an entry in a generic dictionary
data structure. Their scheme associates a pseudorandom label
with each file/keyword pair, and then stores the encrypted file
identifier with that label in a generic dictionary data structure.
The labels are computed in such a way that the client, given
a keyword w to be searched, can compute a short, keyword-
specific key Kw that allows the server to perform the search
by first recovering the necessary labels, then retrieving the
encrypted file identifiers from the dictionary and decrypting
them. This is done by using a pseudorandom function with the
key Kw to create the labels and then applying it to a counter
in order to generate the labels for each (file f , keyword w)
pair. The search in this scheme is fully parallelizable, which is
a key parameter for allowing the scalability of SSE schemes.
To allow additions to the database, the clients need to
be able to compute the labels for the added data. This in
turn requires either the storage of counters by the client or
communication that is proportional to the total number of
keywords ever added or deleted. Deletions are handled via a
pseudorandom revocation list kept by the server and used by
the server to filter out the results. Space can only be reclaimed
via periodical re-encryption of the complete database.
SSE schemes often store data at random locations, thus
resulting in a lack of locality, which impacts the I/O per-
formance. Hence, to achieve high scalability – scaling for
databases containing billions of file/keyword pairs – modi-
fications to improve the I/O performance are needed, on top
of providing a basic scheme using a dictionary.
Databases typically contain a large variability in the number
of matches for different keywords. Searchable encryption
8schemes need to consider this, in order to improve scalability.
One technique used to reduce the number of dictionary re-
trievals is packing the related results together. We differentiate
between keywords with small, medium and large sets of
associated files. For small sets, the file identifiers are stored
directly (in a packed form) in the dictionary. For medium sets,
blocks of pointers are stored in the dictionary and they point to
blocks of file identifiers that are stored in random positions of
an array. For large sets, there are two levels of indirection:
the dictionary stores block of pointers that point to block
of pointers (stored in the array) that point to blocks of file
identifiers.
This scheme [8] is secure against non-adaptive adversaries
in the standard model and against adaptive adversaries in the
random oracle model, has minimal leakage, optimal server
index size (i.e., its size is of the order of the number of
file/keyword pairs), optimal search time (i.e., of the order
of the number of files matching the keyword) and allows
fully parallel searching. One disadvantage of this scheme
is that either expensive communication, or storage in the
client side (to keep track of counters used in the updates)
is required. Another disadvantage is that additional storage
(linear in the number of deletes) is required on the server side
in order to store the revocation list and the space corresponding
to the delete items can only be reclaimed if the complete
database is re-encrypted. Hence this scheme is suitable only
for applications where deletions are relatively rare.
F. Hierarchical Structure of Logarithmic Levels
Stefanov et al. [25] proposed a dynamic SSE scheme that
uses a hierarchical structure of logarithmic levels (which is
reminiscent from techniques for oblivious RAMs). For P pairs
of file/keywords, the server stores a hierarchical data structure
containing log P + 1 levels. Each level ` can store up to 2`
entries, where each entry encrypts the information about one
keyword k, one identifier of a file f that contains w, the type
of operation performed (either add or delete) and a counter for
the number of occurrences of keyword w in the level `. The
scheme ensures that within the same level only one operation
is stored for each pair of file/keyword. One search token per
level of the structure is used to perform the search operation.
In this scheme, every update induces a rebuild of levels in the
data structure. The basic idea is to take the new entry together
with the entries in consecutive full levels 1, . . . , `−1 and merge
them at level `.
This scheme has small leakage, a data structure of linear
size (in the number of file/keyword pairs), and both updates
and searches are in sub-linear time. In contrast to the other
schemes, it achieves the notion of forward security: the search
tokens used in the past cannot be used to search for the
keyword in the documents that are added afterwards. It is
achieved due to the fact that every time a level is rebuilt
a new key is used to encrypt the entries within that level.
However, this smaller leakage comes at the expense of poly-
logarithmic overhead (in the number of file/keyword pairs) on
top of Dynamic SSE overhead of other schemes.
G. Blind Storage
Naveed et al. [9] introduced a basic primitive called blind
storage, which allows the client to store a collection of files on
the server in such a way that all the information about them is
kept secret from the server until they are accessed, including
the number of stored files and the lengths of each file. When a
file is accessed, the server learns about its existence and size,
but not its name or contents. The server can also notice if the
same file is accessed multiple times.
They build a blind storage scheme by storing each file as a
collection of blocks kept in pseudorandom locations. There is
an upper bound N on the number of data blocks that can
be stored. Given a file f with n blocks, αn locations of
the set {1, . . . , N} are chosen using a pseudorandom number
generation and the n blocks of f are stored in n of these
positions. The reason to choose α as many blocks as necessary
to store f is that there may be collisions with the storage
positions of other files. Hence the αn positions that are
retrieved from the server to access f are chosen completely
independently from the other files (and so this does not leak
any information to the server) and then f is stored encrypted in
n of these positions. One issue is that the client needs to know
the number of blocks in f to retrieve it. This can be achieve
by either storing these information on the client (which is
practical if the data collection consists of a small number of
relatively large files), or by storing this information in the first
block and adding one additional round of interaction, in which
the client retrieves the κ first blocks of f . This construction
also supports dynamic blind storage, but the updates leak the
size of the files. For a typical scenario one can have a blowup
factor α = 4.
The idea to obtain an SSE scheme from this blind storage
scheme is to store, for all keywords, the search index entries
(which lists all the files containing the keyword) as individual
files in the blind storage scheme. For dynamic SSE schemes,
the original files and the added files are treated differently
by their scheme, which uses two different indexes. The index
corresponding to the original files is done using the blind
storage scheme and lazy deletion (i.e., after the deletion of
one of the original files, the index file of a keyword is not
updated before the first search is done for that keyword). The
index corresponding to the added files is done using a much
simpler scheme which supports efficient updates.
One advantage of this scheme is that the server does
not need to perform any computation, but only to provide
interfaces for uploading and downloading files, which makes
the scheme much more transparent for using in cloud envi-
ronments. Additionally, its proof of security is in the standard
model, which is a consequence of the fact that the server
does not carry out any decryption. A significant disadvantage
however is that it does not provide the same level of security
for original and added files. The updates leak a deterministic
function of the keywords and so the security guarantees for
the added files are much weaker than for the original files.
This is particularly worrisome for databases that start (almost)
empty and grows over the time – which is often the case in
practice.
9H. Extensions to More Complex Queries and Models
The methodologies described above focused on the case
of single-keyword searches. Cash et al. [11] showed how to
extend the data structures of SSE schemes that allow single-
keyword searches in order to permit more expressive queries
such as conjunctive search and general Boolean queries (via
the OXT protocol of [11]). The information stored in these
data structures is expanded from simple document identifiers
to also include protocol-specific values (of the OXT protocol).
The central idea of the OXT protocol is to start the search
with the least frequent keyword using the basic search scheme
of the single-keyword SSE scheme and then use the specific
values of the OXT protocol in order to filter out the documents
that do not match the remaining keywords. In order to do that
the protocol uses a pre-computed two-party protocol based on
the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption about discrete-log
related hard computational problems. Using this methodology
it is possible to allow more expressive queries while maintain-
ing the search performance. However, the price to pay is the
larger leakage profile.
Jarecki et al. [12] similarly showed how to extend those
data structures in order to allow more complex multi-client
SSE settings. In these settings, the client doing the searches
is not necessarily the data owner, but only gets search tokens
from the data owner in order to perform the authorized queries
that he wants. The authors present solutions for both the case
in which the data owner can and cannot learn the searched
terms. Their solution is essentially an extension of the OXT
protocol.
V. PRIVACY ISSUES
There are obviously trade-offs that have to be done for
searchable encryption to achieve functionality. This is captured
in the security proof of the schemes by the leakage function.
A desirable leakage profile for a SSE scheme would be to
leak only the outcome of the search (i.e., the identifiers of the
documents that contain the queried keyword), which is known
as the access pattern, as trying to hide this information requires
the use of expensive techniques. However, normally one has
to make a bigger compromise: the current efficient approaches
use deterministic search tokens, which leads to the leakage of
the search pattern (i.e., whether two queries are for the same
keyword or not). In addition to access and search patterns,
many schemes also leak some general information, such as
number of files, number of keywords, number of file/keyword
pairs, etc. However, this kind of information is a reasonably
acceptable form of leakage.
The main problem with leakage occurs in dynamic SSE
schemes since many schemes leak additional information
during the add/delete operations. One dangerous form of such
leakage is leaking the search tokens corresponding to the
keywords contained in the added/deleted file (even for the
keywords that were not searched in past) [5]. This renders the
scheme inappropriate for databases in which most of the data
is added incrementally (the scheme would be no more secure
than using a deterministic encryption scheme if the database
is initially empty and the files are incrementally added by the
client). Obviously, if the deterministic search tokens are still
valid in the future (which is the case in all current schemes
except [25]), then the server can test them against the added
files in order to learn if the added file contains the keywords
that were searched in the past; we are not aware of a solution
to this issue.
Extending an SSE scheme that allows single-keyword
searches in order to allow more complex queries [11] also
implies an extended leakage function. In this case, it is not
completely clear how dangerous this additional leakage can be
for the users. In the specific case of the OXT protocol [11],
care should be taken to always use the least frequent keyword
as the first keyword in the query, so that the additional leakage
due to the OTX protocol is as limited as possible.
VI. EFFICIENCY
In terms of efficiency, one essential parameter is the search
time complexity: schemes which have a search time which
is linear in the number of documents are impractical in most
scenarios. Therefore, it is essential to have sub-linear search
time, and ideally optimal search time (i.e., search time which
is proportional to the number of documents that contain the
queried keyword). Schemes which have an asymptotically
optimal search time, but have a linear search time for the
first search of a keyword (such as [10]) are not useful in all
practical scenarios. Having a poly-logarithmic (in the number
of files) overhead over the optimal search time [7], [25] can
also be problematic in the case of databases with large number
of small files.
Another important parameter is the possibility to parallel
the search. Schemes supporting this feature (e.g., [7], [8])
are particularly amenable for usage in a cloud environment.
Additionally, the scheme should ideally be designed so that it
maximizes the I/O performance [8] by improving the locality
of the data structures used for searching.
Another main parameter is the size of the data structures that
need to be stored by the server (and possibly by the client).
Ideally, the data structure kept by the server should have opti-
mal size (i.e., size of the order of the number of file/keyword
pairs). The need for additional storage (linear in the number
of deletes) in order to store a revocation list (e.g., [8]) can
be troublesome in the case of highly dynamic file collections.
Not recovering the space corresponding to the delete items
until the database is completely re-encrypted [8] can limit the
applicability to scenarios where deletions are quite infrequent.
Storing a small amount of information on the client side (such
as one counter per keyword [8] or the search history [10]) in
order to improve the performance can be a good solution in
some scenarios, but is not universally applicable. Finally, the
number of rounds of interaction between the client and the
server should be kept as small as possible in order to minimize
network delay.
VII. OPENSTACK
The OpenStack project is a leading open-source cloud man-
agement platform, receiving support and contributions from
multiple vendors and an extensive community of individual
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contributors. Currently, OpenStack only has native support
for protection of data at rest, which allows limited actions
for volume encryption, ephemeral disk encryption and object
storage encryption.
Implementation of a searchable encryption scheme for the
OpenStack Database components would significantly boost
the security of OpenStack cloud deployments. A first use
case for implementing searchable encryption in OpenStack is
encrypted access to OpenStack service configuration data.
A. Architectural Overview
OpenStack is a free and open source cloud management
platform, which allows to set up, operate and maintain large-
scale cloud computing deployments. It is one of the largest
open source cloud management platforms, supported by more
than 500 companies2. Since its first release in 2010, OpenStack
has had a rapid community-driven evolution and is currently
at its eighth release.
On a higher level, OpenStack is a collection of independent
components that communicate with each other through public
APIs and collectively form a robust cloud computing platform.
Some of the core OpenStack services are the dashboard which
serves as a graphical user interface for the compute component,
the image store and a object store. The three latter components
authenticate through an authentication component.
The current release of OpenStack (“Newton”) comprises
five components which correspond to the above logical struc-
ture:
• OpenStack Compute (code-name Nova) is a core compo-
nent of OpenStack and focuses on providing on-demand
virtual servers. Nova offers several services, spawned on
different nodes in an OpenStack deployment depending
on the purpose of the node. The services are nova-
api, nova-compute, nova-volume, nova-network and nova-
schedule. Additional services, which are not part of Nova
but are however used by it are a queue service (currently
RabbitMQ is used, however any other queue system can
be used instead) as well as a SQL database connection
service (MySQL and PostgreSQL are supported for pro-
duction, sqlite3 for testing purposes).
• OpenStack Networking (code-name Neutron) is a core
project implementing support for a range of networking
models that fulfill the needs of various applications and
user groups. While basic models include flat networks
with VLANs for tenant isolation, Neutron can be ex-
tended to take advantage of the Software-Defined Net-
working model and create massively scalable multi-tenant
virtualized networks. The extension framework also al-
lows to deploy and manage software implementations of
additional network services, e.g. load balancing, firewalls,
virtual private networks, etc.
• OpenStack Dashboard (code-name Horizon) is a Django-
based dashboard which serves as a user and administra-
tor interface to OpenStack. The dashboad is deployed
through mod_wsgi in Apache and is separated into
2List of supporting organization: http://www.openstack.org/foundation/
companies/
a reusable python component and a presentation layer.
Keystone also uses an easily replaceable data store which
keeps information from other OpenStack components.
• OpenStack Image Service (code-name Glance) is VM
image repository that stores and versions the images
that are made available to the users initially or modified
through subsequent runtime updates.
• OpenStack Object Storage (code-name Swift) is an object
store with a distributed architecture which aims to avoid
single points of failure and facilitate horizontal scalability.
It is limited to the storage and retrieval of files and
does not support mounting directories as in the case of a
fileserver.
• OpenStack Identity (code-name Keystone) is a unified
point of integration for the OpenStack policy, token and
catalog authentication. Keystone has a pluggable architec-
ture to support multiple integrations, and currently LDAP,
SQL and Key-Value Store backends are supported.
• OpenStack Block Storage (code-name Cinder) manages
the creation and operation of block devices on servers,
enabling tenants to fulfil their storage requirements. The
block storage system is appropriate for performance-
sensitive scenarios (e.g. database storage, expandable file
systems, access to raw block-level storage, etc.). Besides
the native block storage implementation, the OpenStack
Block Storage currently provides support for other storage
platforms.
• OpenStack Telemetry (code-name Ceilometer) service ag-
gregates usage and performance data across OpenStack
services and provides support for billing and a global
resource utilization map. This is necessary as service pro-
vides often require to collect accurate information about
the utilization of computing, storage and networking re-
sources within a certain infrastructure cloud deployment.
• OpenStack Orchestration (code-name Heat) In order to
support scalable, large-scale cluster deployment, Open-
Stack uses a template-based orchestration engine which
allows automated deployment of infrastructure. The or-
chestration engine is used both for pre- and post-
deployment actions and configuration changes, as well
as for auto-scaling of key infrastructure elements based
on the information provided by the telemetry service.
• OpenStack Database (code-name Trove) service provides
a native OpenStack relational database which can be
used for infrastructure management tasks, such as a de-
ployment, patching, backing up, restoring and monitoring
infrastructure components.
• OpenStack Bare-Metal Provisioning (code-name Ironic)
service aims to provision bare metal (i.e. non-virtualized)
computing resources similar to the current application of
PXE and IPMI protocols.
All of the above described components interact through a set
of REST application programming interfaces (APIs) and form
the fabric of a cloud computing infrastructure deployment.
The OpenStack documentation 3 describes in details each
of the above named components and their interaction.
3OpenStack Documentation Page http://docs.openstack.org
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B. Storage Protection Mechanims
There are currently several mechanisms for protection of
data in OpenStack, both for data at rest and data in transit.
While data in transit can be protected using common mecha-
nism such as TLS and IPSec, we instead focus on the storage
protection mechanisms found in OpenStack. When it comes
to confidentiality of data at rest, the available functionality
is limited to basic symmetric encryption capabilities. Thus,
OpenStack tenants have the following complementary options:
volume (i.e. block storage) encryption, ephemeral disk encryp-
tion and object storage encryption.
The volume encryption functionality in OpenStack supports
per-tennant creation and usage of encrypted volumes, as well
as encrypted backups and is exposed to a key management
service. Some proposed approaches for volume encryption
allow to transparently mount volumes to guest virtual ma-
chines with the encryption and decryption being handled by
the disk encryption subsystem of the cloud host. However,
this functionality is not currently integrated in the official
OpenStack release.
The ephemeral disk encryption feature allows encryption of
the temporary work space used by each individual virtual host
operating system. This prevents plain-text residual information
from earlier tenants to be left on the physical disks of the cloud
hosts.
Finally, object storage encryption is currently limited to
disk-level encryption per node. The encryption functionality
for the Swift object storage is currently under development.
C. Searchable Encryption in OpenStack
Searchable encryption has the potential to considerable
expand the use of encryption of data at rest within Open-
Stack and directly contribute to the proliferation of security-
hardened OpenStack deployments. Furthermore, a contribution
to the implementation of a searchable encryption scheme for
the block storage in OpenStack would be welcomed by the
OpenStack community and give significant visibility among
the users and contributors of the project.
A feasible target for implementing searchable encryption
functionality is the OpenStack configuration database (code-
name Trove). The database contains sensitive configuration
data and is accessed for operational purposes by various
components of the OpenStack deployment. Disclosure of such
sensitive configuration information can lead to a complete and
irreversible compromise of the cloud deployment. Implement-
ing searchable encryption functionality for the configuration
database would allow the system components to identify and
retrieve encrypted entries in the configuration database without
having to decrypt the entire set of stored data. This would
help protect the confidentiality of the data with a minimal
communication overhead.
VIII. RECOMMENDATION FOR IMPLEMENTATION
In the light of the issues discussed in the previous sections
it is obvious that some kind of compromise has to be done
as none of the state of art searchable encryption schemes
achieves all the ideal attributes. Sub-linear time and support
for dynamic databases are with great probability the most
important points and therefore they should be supported by
the scheme chosen to be integrated with OpenStack. Another
important facet, as pointed out earlier, is the ability to add
support for search over encrypted data while changing the
server side as less as possible (in order to minimize the
resistance against its adoption from the side of the OpenStack
community). Taking these parameters into account, the scheme
of Naveed et al. [9] stands out as the most appropriate for
integration with OpenStack-based platforms as it views the
cloud simply as a storage service, has optimal search time
and supports dynamic databases. One additional advantage of
this scheme is that it has a security proof in the standard
security model, as opposed to most schemes which were only
proven to be secure in the heuristic random oracle model. The
disadvantage of the scheme is that the level of security for
the added files is smaller than for the original files. However,
we considered that this is the best trade-off possible given the
current state of affairs in the field of searchable encryption.
Therefore our choice was to implement the scheme of Naveed
et al. [9] in order to check its performance for real applications
and the possibility of integrating it with OpenStack.
IX. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
For the needs of the paper, we implemented the Searchable
Encryption Scheme on top of a Blind Storage System as
proposed by [9]. In order to be comparable with their findings
our implementation was built with the same tool chain and
uses the same third party libraries as far as known. This is to
say, the application is written in ISO C++ 2011 and uses the
Boost [26], Crypto++ [27] and CurlPP [28], [29] libraries.
We used the CurlPP is a multi-protocol network library
for all network IO. We used the Crypto++ library for all
cryptographic primitives. The Boost library was used for two
different aspects: to abstract from OS-dependent parts such
as runtime configuration and user interaction. This part does
not contribute to the performance measurement, because any
interaction “with the outside world” (like reading runtime
parameters and user input) only occurs during the start-up
phase of the program and not during the actual processing
phase. Moreover, the Boost library is used to split the files
into tokens and to create lists of keywords that are stored
in the index and can be searched for. We stress this aspect,
because [9] do not state how the files were preprocessed and
tokenized and our results are not comparable to theirs (see
details below). For more details on the build environment see
Table Ia.
We chose a comparable environment as [9] (see Table Ic)
but had to change the runtime parameters to those depicted in
Table Ib. The reasons are explained in IX-A.
Originally, we planned to run our performance measure-
ments in a somewhat realistic scenario with a real FTP server
and virtualized network communication. For this purpose a
virtual machine was set up on the same host as the client
(see Table Id). All network communication was sent through a
virtual network between the client and the FTP server running
within the virtual machine. However, we later modified the
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GNU Toolchain (GCC compiler) 5.2.1
Boost 1.58.0
Crypto++ 5.6.1
Curl++ 0.7.3
Curl 7.43.0
(a) Build environment, libraries and versions
α (expansion factor) 4
κ (minimal number of blocks per file) 80
block size (bytes) 4096
total block number 218
(b) Runtime parameters
CPU AMD A10-7850K Radeon R7
RAM 16 GB
OS Ubuntu Desktop 15.10
(c) Client environment
CPU Virtual CPU with 1 core (see client)
RAM 2 GB
OS Debian 8 (Jessie)
(d) Server environment (actually not used)
TABLE I: Experimental setup
setup and replaced the network attached storage by a local
storage (IX-A).
We also used the Enron dataset [30] and selected random
subsets of appropriate size for the experiments.
A. Preliminary remarks
In a first experiment we initialized the blind storage system
with the parameters used by Naveed, Prabhakaran, and Gunter,
i.e. 222 blocks with 256 bytes each or in other words 1GB of
total storage space. The backend storage was provided by a
FTP server inside a virtual machine. The build phase of the
blind storage took about 590 s of effective CPU time (312 s in
user space and 278 s in system space) but roughly 6 hours of
real execution time. We repeated the same experiment with
a much smaller number of blocks and traced all function
calls by means of the profiling tool CallGrind as part of the
instrumentation suite Valgrind [31]. This revealed that 95% of
the running time was spent within the FTP client library. Each
of the 222 blocks is represented by a single file that needs to be
transferred between the client and the server. No matter how
the file transfer was scheduled (sequentially, n-parallel, reuse
of TCP connections) the FTP transfer represented a serious
bottle neck. The initialization and termination of a individual
file transfer creates a non-negligible overhead especially if
each file (or block) has only 256 bytes of payload. This still
holds if the FTP connection as a whole is kept open and is
reused for all transfers.
Naveed, Prabhakaran, and Gunter did not consider the IO
time for their performance analysis, hence we decided to
replace the FTP storage by a local storage4. After that the
real execution time dropped down to 500 s (instead of 6 h).
However, we stress that for any realistic deployment this is
a serious concern, because the whole point in having a blind
storage system is to put it on some untrusted network storage.
To ignore the time spent on network file transfer leads to
seriously misleading numbers.
Originally, we also planned to use the same runtime param-
eters as Naveed, Prabhakaran, and Gunter, namely 222 blocks
with 256 bytes each. However, this choice of parameters lead
to a waste of disk space. In order to store 222 blocks (or
files) one has to use a hierarchical naming scheme similar
to the one used internally by many proxy daemons. In our
4Essentially, all function calls to the FTP library were replaced by
equivalent local system calls
case the files representing the blocks were enumerated from
./00/00/00.bin through ./3f/ff/ff.bin. This direc-
tory structure already occupies disk space by itself. Moreover,
a file size of 256 bytes cannot be recommended, because most
filesystems allocate files in chunks of 4 kB. On an EXT-4
filesystem the bare directory structure already used 0.5GB
and the fully built blind storage scheme with 1 GB storage
net capacity used 34GB of tangible disk space.
Hence, we tweaked the parameters and used 218 blocks
with 4kB each (see Table Ib) to better match the underlying
filesystem’s own parameters. With these settings the bare
directory structure only used 8.2MB and the complete blind
storage scheme allocated 1.1GB of real disc space, thus the
overhead dropped down to 10%. Moreover, the real execution
time of the built phase further declined to 125s whereby 12s
were spent in user-space and 113s were spent in kernel-space.
We stress that we did not calculate whether the modified
settings offer the same level of security and success probabil-
ity. It is unlikely that they do, because the number of blocks
were reduced, but a storage and processing overhead of 34 is
not acceptable for any realistic scenario.
B. Methodology
Naveed, Prabhakaran, and Gunter state that they concen-
trated on client-side computation time and the reported num-
bers suggest that they somehow calculated out the costs for IO
operations (especially because they used a remote DropBox
as their backend). Moreover they report that the symmetric
encryption (AES) accounts for a significant part of the runtime.
We cannot support this statement if IO operations over a
network are considered, but the statement becomes true if all
network operations are replaced by local disk IO. In this case
CallGrind [31] reports that 35% of the runtime is spent inside
the AES library.
However, it remains unclear how Naveed, Prabhakaran, and
Gunter measured the “bare” computation time. One approach
is to use an instrumentation suite such as Valgrind [31] and
look at the time being spent in individual function calls. How-
ever, this raises the question of functions to be instrumented;
moreover, this approach is highly implementation specific.
Another approach is to query the process scheduler of the
operating system and look at the amount of the process spent
in user-space and kernel-space. One could argue that the time
spent in user-space is the “true” computation time (tokeniza-
tion, index calculation, encryption) while the time spent in
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kernel-space is related to IO. However, this is misleading, since
even after we replaced all network IO by local file IO and thus
reducing the total execution time of the built phase of the blind
storage from 6 h to 125 s the process spent 90% of its time
in kernel-space (113 s vs. 12 s). However, as already stated
35% of the runtime was due to the AES operations. These
observations are consistent, because a huge portion of the AES
operation is memory management and thus contributes to the
execution time in kernel-space.
In summary, we decided to take the total execution time
from process creation through process termination as reported
by the Linux time-command. Hence, we do not distinguish
between different aspects of the execution time. With respect
to practical deployment we argue this is a valid approach, be-
cause a typical end-user is not concerned with what contributes
to the runtime. However, we would like to point out that all
numbers are generated with a local storage backend, rather
than a NAS backend.
C. Test 1: Building the Blind Storage System
Deviating from the numbers depicted in Table Ib the first
series of tests built a blind storage system at different sizes by
varying the number of blocks. The block size was kept at 4 kB
to match the underlying filesystem. The results are shown in
Table II.
Unsurprisingly, the runtime is linear in the total size of the
Blind Storage scheme.
D. Test 2: Indexing and uploading documents
Due to our changed runtime parameters (218 blocks 4kiB
instead of 222 blocks 256B), we were unable to upload up
to 256MiB of files, as the scheme ran out of free first
blocks prematurely. Recall that the largest test set of Naveed,
Prabhakaran, and Gunter was 256MiB. We were able to upload
at most 8MiB, as the Enron test set consists of tens of
thousands of small ASCII files with each file only consisting
of a few bytes but each file occupies a integral multiple of
the block size. In our scenario this leads to significant frag-
mentation. However, our findings are consistent with Naveed,
Prabhakaran, and Gunter. As our block size is 16 times larger,
the possible maximum size of the total upload is expected
to be smaller by the same factor. The results are depicted in
Table III.
E. Test 3: Searching
Similar to Naveed, Prabhakaran, and Gunter we also search
for the keyword “the” in the uploaded Enron dataset. In
addition to that, we also counted the time needed to handle the
lazy delete strategy, as the lazy delete strategy is essential for
the security of the scheme and comes with significant costs.
Without this strategy searching for a specific keyword is
merely downloading the corresponding index file. This sim-
plified task is extremely fast but the result of the search may
be incorrect. Whenever a file is modified (or deleted) it is
added to all index files for each keyword it contains after the
modification (n.b.: in case of deletion the file is added to no
Total net size of files (MiB) 1 2 4
Total number of files 214 421 1267
Number of results 156 348 1020
Total execution time (ms) 97 186 435
TABLE IV: Results of test 3: Searching for the keyword “the”
index, because the file is essentially empty after deletion). This
implies that each index may list a file multiple times if old
versions of the same file also contained the same keyword.
Moreover, a file might be listed although it does not contain
the keyword anymore but an outdated version of the same file
did. The latter also holds if the file was deleted. In order to
get rid of such “phantom” entries, each entry in the index is
accompanied with a hash of the file content. Upon searching
for a keyword, the stored hash is compared to the hash of the
current file content and if they differ the entry is considered
outdated and removed from the search result. Moreover, the
outdated entry is removed from the index and the revised index
is written back to the server. In order to be able to compare
the stored hashes with the current hash the first block of each
file in the search result must be downloaded from the server
(via the Blind Storage Scheme) and locally decrypted. Even
worse, downloading a file also implies to upload a fresh re-
encryption of the file such that the server cannot distinguish
between a read and a write access.
In summary, skipping the lazy deletion strategy does not
reflect what would actually happen if the scheme was deployed
in practice. Hence, we argue that taking the time of the lazy
deletion strategy into account is the right way to measure the
performance.
The results are depicted in Table IV. Our findings indicate
an execution time that is slower than [9] by a factor of
approximately 90. This is expected because much time is spent
in performing the consistency checks due to the lazy deletion
strategy.
F. Summary of the Implementation Report
We implemented the searchable encryption scheme via
Blind Storage of Naveed, Prabhakaran, and Gunter in order to
reproduce their performance results and to experiment with its
performance in practical situations. Unfortunately, we cannot
deny that – despite all improvements over previous schemes
– this scheme still fails to be practically useful. Basically, this
is due to two main reasons.
The first reason can be traced back to latencies within the
network IO. The security of the scheme stems from the fact
that an individual file is randomly scattered across many small
chunks of data that needs to be transferred between the client
and the server. In fact, this is the same problem that oblivious
RAM (ORAM) also suffers from.
The second reason is that the scheme is highly wasteful
in space. Both our test scenario and the scenario of Naveed,
Prabhakaran, and Gunter used a blind storage with a net size
of 1GB, but with different block sizes. Due to a 16 times
smaller block size Naveed, Prabhakaran, and Gunter were able
to upload 256MB into the blind storage. But this blind storage
requires 34GB of space on the underlying filesystem. Taking
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number of blocks (218) / total net size (GiB) 1 2 3 4 6 8
size of bare directory structure (MiB) 4.02 8.04 12.1 16.1 24.1 32.1
total gross size on disk (GiB) 1.01 2.02 3.04 4.05 6.07 8.09
overhead (%) 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.13
average total runtime (s) 62.8 125 189 250 375 501
TABLE II: Parameters and results of test 1 (the block size was held constant at 4 kiB)
Total net size of files (MB) 1 2 4
Number of files 214 421 1267
Number of file-keyword-pairs 54945 111546 246657
Total execution time (s) 148 315 964
TABLE III: Results of test 2: Indexing and uploading documents
both factors together yields an overhead by a factor of 136.
We used a much larger block size that better matched the
underlying file system. Thus the gross usage was 1.01GiB.
However, we could only upload 8MiB into the blind storage
system, which has yield a factor of 130. In both cases, both
overhead factors are far from being practical, due to the need
to allocating two magnitudes more space than required to store
the data.
X. CONCLUSION
Cloud storage and computing is growing exponentially due
to its cost-effectiveness, but it brings with it new security
concerns. While security solutions that protect the clients data
from the cloud are urgently needed, they must impact the
clients’ functionality as little as possible. Dynamic searchable
encryption schemes can be very useful in this context. Indeed
we have seen a lot of progress in this area in the last couple
of years [32], [33]. Considering the latest developments in the
fiels, we first performed an extensive survey of the literature of
searchable encryption in order to determine the schemes that
look more appropriate for integration with cloud solutions.
The scheme Naveed et al. [9] stand out since it views the
cloud as a simple storage service. Hence we proceeded with
an implementation of that scheme and performed experiments
in order to determine its practicality for real applications.
Unfortunately, despite all theoretical progress presented by
that scheme, it is still not practical for deployment in most
real-world applications. Perhaps, other state of the art dynamic
searchable encryption schemes which involve more interaction
on the cloud side can prove to be better suited for deployment
in real systems, however we fear that they can also fail to be
practical enough for deployment. Searchable encryption has a
lot of potential for increasing the security of cloud solutions.
It is a very interesting direction for future research, in order
to obtain more practical solutions that can be deployed in real
applications.
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